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Wrongful Extradition: Reforming the 
Committal Phase of Canada’s 
Extradition Law 
R O B E R T  J .  C U R R I E *  
ABSTRACT 
 
There has recently been an upswing in interest around extradition in 
Canada, particularly in light of the high-profile and troubling case of 
Hassan Diab who was extradited to France on the basis of what 
turned out to be an ill-founded case. Diab’s case highlights some of 
the problems with Canada’s Extradition Act and proceedings 
thereunder. This paper argues that the “committal stage” of 
extradition proceedings, involving a judicial hearing into the basis of 
the requesting state’s case, is unfair and may not be compliant with 
the Charter and that the manner in which the Crown conducts these 
proceedings contributes to this unfairness. It also argues that 
regardless of the Act’s constitutionality, in light of Diab and other 
disturbing cases, the time is ripe for law reform to ensure that 
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extradition proceedings are carried out in a way that is consistent with 
Canadian public policy. Some suggestions for reform are made, as well as a 
proposal for a serious Parliamentary effort. 
 
Keywords: extradition; international law; Charter of Rights and Freedoms; 
transnational crime; International Assistance Group; Crown law 
I. INTRODUCTION 
xtradition – the formal surrender of individuals between states in 
order to facilitate criminal proceedings – is often thought of as an 
obscure legal process, despite its reputedly ancient origins.1 This is no 
less true in Canada where the relatively small number of extradition cases 
are handled predominantly by lawyers in Justice Canada’s International 
Assistance Group (IAG)2 and a smattering of defence lawyers across the 
country, most of the latter of whom do not practice enough in the field to 
develop any particular expertise. The Canadian legal literature on 
extradition is not voluminous. 
However, the veil of obscurity has been yanked open in the last several 
years. Internationally, extradition has been front and centre, from a 
proposed extradition law that sparked months of rioting and civil unrest in 
Hong Kong3 to Julian Assange’s futile years-long attempt to avoid the British 
extradition hearing under way at the time of writing (which may see him 
extradited to face American wrath over the Wikileaks disclosures).4 For 
Canada’s part, the arrest of Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou in December 
2018 on an American extradition warrant has embroiled it in what is easily 
        
1  Ivan Shearer, Extradition in International Law (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1971) at 5. 
2  See Section II.C, below. 
3  “Hong Kong: Timeline of extradition protests”, BBC News (4 September 2019), online: 
<www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-49340717> [perma.cc/MD68-J5FZ]. See also 
“Canada suspends extradition treaty with Hong Kong over new security law”, CBC News 
(3 July 2020), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-suspending-extradition-treaty-
hong-kong-over-security-law-1.5636479> [perma.cc/B7LG-R866] (Canada recently 
“suspended” its extradition treaty with Hong Kong as a means of protesting the new 
security law imposed upon it by China). 
4  “Julian Assange appears in dock as extradition hearing resumes”, BBC News (7 
September 2020), online: <www.bbc.com/news/uk-54060427> [perma.cc/P4UV-8D3 
P]. 
E 
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the most complex and daunting foreign policy dispute it has faced in 
decades5 and put our extradition relations firmly on the public radar. 
Even aside from the Meng case, however, Canada’s extradition laws 
have increasingly come under scrutiny in the last several years by way of a 
slowly-building groundswell of unease around the mechanics and 
application of the 1999 Extradition Act.6 An early and prescient critique by 
Professor Anne La Forest suggested that while the then-“new” Act was 
certainly capable of achieving the Crown’s stated goals of making Canada’s 
extradition process more efficient and easier to access by partner states, it 
had also greatly reduced the role of the courts and focused too much power 
and discretion in the hands of the executive (specifically, the Minister of 
Justice).7 Over the course of two decades, and even in the face of (mostly 
unsuccessful) constitutional challenges, this forecast has proven to be true, 
and there have been growing calls for reform of the Extradition Act – a piece 
of legislation that frequent extradition commentator Gary Botting has 
called (perhaps hyperbolically) “the least fair law in Canada.”8 
This unease came to a head during 2018–2019, during which time there 
was intense public interest in the case of Dr. Hassan Diab. Diab, a Canadian 
citizen of Lebanese descent, was extradited to France in 2014 to face 
terrorism charges, only to be released more than three years later when (as 
had been apparent during the Canadian extradition proceedings) the 
French case against him was exposed as being without foundation. This 
controversial case sparked calls for reform, which will be explored below. 
More recently, a highly-criticized extradition case ended in the death of 
the individual sought. The leading recent extradition decision by the 
Supreme Court of Canada, MM v United States of America,9 dealt with an 
extradition request by the U.S. for Michele Messina, a dual Canadian-U.S. 
citizen who fled the state of Georgia with her children in 2010 for fear of 
        
5  See Charles-Louis Labrecque, “Canada-China Relations Since Meng Wanzhou’s 
Arrest” (3 December 2019), online: Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada <www.asiapacific.c 
a/publication/canada-china-relations-wanzhous-arrest> [perma.cc/7BHW-NX38]. 
6  Extradition Act, SC 1999, c 18 [Act]. 
7  Anne Warner La Forest, “The Balance Between Liberty and Comity in the Evidentiary 
Requirements Applicable to Extradition Proceedings” (2002) 28:1 Queen’s LJ 95 (QL). 
8  Elyse Skura, “Nunavut priest sex abuse case stirs up criticism of ‘least fair law in 
Canada’”, CBC News (22 February 2019), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/e 
xtradition-france-canada-diab-rivoire-1.5028783> [perma.cc/LC2K-7AHZ]. 
9  MM v United States of America, 2015 SCC 62 [MM]. 
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her abusive husband.10 After she was arrested at a women’s shelter in 
Quebec, she fought extradition for nine years. In its 2015 decision, a 
majority of the Supreme Court of Canada upheld her surrender despite 
clear evidence that had the conduct occurred in Canada, she would have a 
defence of necessity available, but that the defence was not available in the 
U.S. This, the Court ruled, was a matter for the foreign trial court. Then-
Justice Minister Jody Wilson-Raybould agreed to re-consider the case but 
eventually confirmed the surrender order, and the Supreme Court denied 
leave to appeal on the confirmed order on October 17, 2019.11 Messina died 
by suicide in prison three weeks later,12 bringing her case to a dramatic and 
troubling close. 
Extradition from Canada,13 as will be explained below, is a three-phase 
process. This article will focus on the second “judicial” or “committal” phase 
and argue that Canada’s law and procedures are in need of significant 
reform. Changes are required, not because extradition itself is somehow 
illegitimate, but because our extradition machinery has a number of 
problematic features that produce unfairness, both systemically and in 
individual cases. 
The rest of this paper will proceed in five parts. Part II will give an 
overview of the Diab case and explain how it, in particular, has provided 
impetus for reform efforts. Part III provides a brief overview of extradition 
law and procedure in Canada to set the backdrop for the reform proposals. 
Part IV will critique the law and procedure that underpin the committal 
phase and offer suggestions for change, while Part V will give similar 
treatment to the manner in which the Crown’s role in extradition is 
conceived and executed. Reference to specific cases, particularly Diab and 
        
10  Some background about the case can be found in Matthew Behrens, “Canada’s 
extradition law a dangerous back-door bludgeon for abusive ex-spouses” (14 December 
2018), online: rabble.ca <rabble.ca/columnists/2018/12/canadas-extradition-law-dange 
rous-back-door-bludgeon-abusive-ex-spouses> [perma.cc/XA5Z-62GA]. 
11  Michele Marie Mulkey aka Michele Marie Messina v Minister of Justice of Canada on behalf of 
the United States of America, 2019 CarswellQue8803, 2019 CarswellQue8804 (SCC). 
12  Verity Stevenson, “Quebec mother who was to be extradited to U.S. on custody charge 
dies in Laval jail”, CBC News (7 November 2019), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ 
montreal/quebec-mother-to-be-extradited-us-dies-in-jail-1.5351567> [perma.cc/DT9P- 
WNAD]; Matthew Behrens, “An act of institutional femicide: Remembering the life of 
Michele M” (21 November 2019), online: rabble.ca <rabble.ca/columnists/2019/11/act 
-institutional-femicide-remembering-life-michele-m> [perma.cc/22JX-C3WA]. 
13  Part 3 of the Extradition Act, which deals with extradition to Canada, will not be 
examined here. 
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MM, will be made where useful, though comprehensive treatment must be 
sacrificed for brevity’s sake. Part VI will offer conclusions and suggestions 
for further work. 
II. FRANCE V DIAB : THE CASE THAT MAKES THE CASE FOR 
REFORM 
Prior to the Meng case, Hassan Diab’s was probably the only extradition 
case that could truly be said to have captured substantial attention among 
Canadians. Detailed accounts can be found in a thorough academic 
article,14 numerous media stories,15 and most importantly a 124-page 
external review by former Ontario Deputy Attorney General Murray Segal, 
which was commissioned by the Justice Minister.16 In brief, the Ottawa 
sociology professor was arrested on an extradition warrant in November 
2008, sought by France as the alleged perpetrator of the bombing of a Paris 
synagogue in 1980. Initially detained, he was released on extremely 
restrictive bail conditions, including the imposition of an electronic bracelet 
costing $2,000.00 per month for which he had to pay. “Justice for Hassan 
Diab,” a volunteer organization, was formed to fundraise for his bail and 
defence, and to lobby for staying the case and reform of Canada’s 
extradition laws.17 
From the outset, Diab maintained that he was the victim of mistaken 
identity and had been in Lebanon at the time of the bombing. He was 
eventually represented by distinguished Ottawa defence lawyer Don Bayne, 
and the case was fought fiercely by both Bayne and the IAG lawyers, to the 
extent that the judge at the committal hearing was moved to comment on 
        
14  Maeve W. McMahon, “The Problematically Low Threshold of Evidence in Canadian 
Extradition Law: An Inquiry into its Origins; and Repercussions in the Case of Hassan 
Diab” (2019) 42:3 Man LJ 303. 
15  See e.g. Amanda Connolly, “Who is Hassan Diab and why was his extradition so 
controversial?”, Global News (26 July 2019), online: <globalnews.ca/news/5682551/has 
san-diab-extradition-report/> [perma.cc/74D3-GF65]. 
16  Canada, Department of Justice, Independent Review of the Extradition of Dr. Hassan Diab 
(Report), by Murray D. Segal (Ottawa: DOJ, May 2019), online: <www.justice.gc.ca/> 
[perma.cc/9X9W-BQJY] [Segal Report]. 
17  Its website can be found here: “Justice for Hassan Diab: Preserve the Rights of 
Canadians Under Extradition Law” (last modified 9 February 2020), online: 
<www.justiceforhassandiab.org/> [perma.cc/S2K6-2U5S]. 
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its intensity.18 Diab’s defence centred on the weakness of the case presented 
by France, which essentially rested on a highly-contested handwriting 
analysis. Judicial decisions in the course of the proceeding featured several 
now-infamous dicta. The judge who presided over the committal hearing 
described the French case as being so weak that if Diab received a fair trial 
in France, he would likely be acquitted—but that nonetheless, Canada’s 
extradition law required that he be surrendered.19 Affirming both the 
committal decision and the decision by the Minister of Justice to surrender 
Diab, the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed concerns that the French case 
was not even ready for trial, remarking that Diab clearly would “not simply 
‘languish in prison.’”20 
After being extradited, Diab did indeed “simply languish” for more 
than three years, mostly in solitary confinement, in a maximum-security 
prison while the French investigation continued. He was released – without 
ever being committed for trial – when it became clear that the case had 
foundered completely, and what evidence there was indicated that Diab was 
not the bomber.21 Diab’s return to Canada in January 2018 sparked 
renewed criticism from the Justice for Hassan Diab organization, now 
joined by others including Amnesty International, the British Columbia 
Civil Liberties Association (both of which had intervened in the original 
appeal), and the International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group. 
Controversy increased when media reporting revealed that Canadian 
officials had withheld exculpatory evidence and actively assisted French 
officials in shoring up the foundering French case.22 A group of academics, 
defence lawyers, and representatives from human rights organizations 
convened a colloquium to formulate a set of reform proposals, which is 
expected to be published in the future.23 
Calls for examination of how extradition had gone so wrong drew 
concern from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chrystia Freeland, who 
disclosed that both she and the Prime Minister had pressed France to return 
        
18  France (Republic) v Diab, 2011 ONSC 337 at para 193 [Diab Sup Ct]. 
19  Ibid at para 191. 
20  France (Republic) v Diab, 2014 ONCA 374 at para 176 [Diab CA]. 
21  Segal Report, supra note 16 at 70–71. 
22  This was confirmed in Segal Report, supra note 16. See section IV, below. 
23  See Changing Canada’s Extradition Laws:  The Halifax Colloquium’s Proposals for Law Reform 
[forthcoming, copy on file with author]. Disclosure: I was the convenor and chair of the 
Colloquium. 
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Diab.24 Prime Minister Justin Trudeau stated that “what happened to [Diab] 
should never have happened,” and promised that the federal government 
would “make sure this never happens again.”25 However, this promise was 
eventually dissipated by the Segal Report which concluded that while Diab’s 
case had seen some unfortunate events, all relevant laws and policies had 
been followed and all Crown personnel had acted appropriately.26  
A criminal prosecution that results in an innocent person being 
convicted is referred to as a “wrongful conviction.” In Hassan Diab’s case, 
an extradition proceeding led to a demonstrably innocent person being 
extradited to face a faulty foreign criminal process, in a case where the Prime 
Minister of Canada stated that extradition “should never have happened.” 
The only sensible descriptive phrase for this is “wrongful extradition,” and 
that is the term that will be used in this paper. The critique here is based on 
the simple premise that an extradition system that allowed the wrongful 
extradition of Hassan Diab to occur must be in need of reform. This need 
is made all the more pressing by the fact that, as discussed in Part V below, 
the government authorities in charge of extradition are explicitly and 
publicly of the view that no reform is needed and that Diab’s extradition to 
France was marred only by the fact that it took so long. 
III. THE CURRENT CANADIAN SCHEME FOR EXTRADITION 
A. The International Law Backdrop: Sovereignty, Treaties, 
and Arrangements 
Extradition is the oldest and still one of the primary tools to accomplish 
the goal of inter-state cooperation in the suppression of crime generally, and 
transnational crime in particular. It has been defined as: 
[T]he formal rendition of a criminal fugitive from a state that has custody (the 
requested state) to a state that wishes either to prosecute or, if the fugitive has 
        
24  Jim Bronskill, “Justice Minister Wilson-Raybould orders independent review of Hassan 
Diab extradition case”, National Post (30 May 2018), online: <nationalpost.com/news/p 
olitics/justice-minister-orders-external-review-of-hassan-diab-extradition-case> [perma.cc 
/85XD-JAFJ]. 
25  David Cochrane & Lisa Laventure, “Hassan Diab to boycott external review of 2014 
extradition to France”, CBC News (24 July 2018), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/politics/h 
assan-diab-boycott-external-review-france-extradition-1.4758418> [perma.cc/382M-F4F 
N]. 
26  Segal Report, supra note 16 at 13–14. 
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already been convicted of an offence, to enforce a penal sentence (the requesting 
state).27 
Extradition is made necessary by a fundamental rule of customary 
international law that prohibits states from enforcing their laws on the 
territories of other states.28 In the criminal sphere, this means that police 
cannot investigate or effect arrests outside their own country. Accordingly, 
in order for states to be able to prosecute individuals who leave or escape 
from their territories,29 they enter into agreements with foreign states under 
which each agrees to arrest and transmit the “fugitives” (now typically 
referred to as “persons sought”) upon request and subject to certain 
conditions. The most standard practice is for states to enter into bilateral 
extradition treaties, which allows each government to carefully select the 
states with which it wishes to have such cooperation, in accordance with 
domestic priorities, human rights obligations, etc. Also, there are a number 
of multilateral crime suppression treaties, geared towards facilitating inter-
state cooperation around suppressing particular transnational crimes, 
which have extradition provisions.30 
Canada is party to 51 bilateral extradition treaties31 and a large number 
of the crime suppression conventions that contain extradition provisions. 
A Schedule to the Extradition Act also designates certain states32 and 
        
27  Robert J. Currie & Joseph Rikhof, International & Transnational Criminal Law, 3rd ed 
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2020) at 531. It is important to distinguish extradition from other 
legal means of removing individuals from a state, like immigration law-based 
mechanisms such as deportation or the expulsion of spies or foreign diplomats. 
Extradition relies explicitly on state-to-state agreements and is designed to facilitate 
criminal (and, increasingly, quasi-criminal/regulatory) prosecutions. It is a formal legal 
process with unique international and domestic law machinery. 
28  R v Hape, 2007 SCC 26. 
29  Or, at least, lawfully to do so. History is replete with examples of states simply abducting 
criminal fugitives from foreign states, which is a breach of international law. See Currie 
& Rikhof, supra note 29 at 560–67. 
30  Neil Boister, An Introduction to Transnational Criminal Law, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2018), c 20; Joanna Harrington, “Extradition of Transnational 
Criminals” in Neil Boister & Robert J. Currie, eds, Routledge Handbook of Transnational 
Criminal Law (London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2015) 153. 
31  Reasonably current compiled lists can be found at Halsbury’s Laws of Canada (online), 
Extradition & Mutual Legal Assistance, “Introduction: Extradition Partners” (I.2) at HEX-
2 “Creation of Extradition Obligation” (2019 Reissue); Seth Weinstein & Nancy L. 
Dennison, Prosecuting and Defending Extradition Cases: A Practitioner’s Handbook (Toronto: 
Emond Publishing, 2017) at 15–16. 
32  Most of which are Commonwealth states, including the United Kingdom. 
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entities33 as “extradition partners,” which unlocks Canada’s extradition 
machinery for those states/entities in the same manner as a treaty does. 
Most commonly, Canada makes and receives extradition requests via its 
bilateral treaties, particularly with the U.S.34 which unsurprisingly sees the 
most traffic of any of the treaties.  
While the treaties do not play a large role in this article, it is worth 
noting that, constitutionally, they are strictly the preserve of the federal 
executive, and “that neither Parliament nor the provincial legislatures need, 
as a matter of law, to be consulted before the Crown binds Canada to an 
international agreement.”35 So far as can be seen from the rather paltry 
public sources on point,36 decisions on whether to negotiate extradition 
treaties are formally made via consultations between the Minister of Justice 
and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and negotiations are conducted by 
officials within those two departments. Since the introduction of the federal 
treaty tabling policy in 2008, it appears that treaties are at least tabled in the 
House of Commons but do not attract debate;37 nor are the explanatory 
memoranda which are meant to accompany them ever published.38 
        
33  Specifically, the International Criminal Court and the UN International Criminal 
Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 
34  Treaty on Extradition between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United 
States of America, United States and Canada, 3 December 1971, Can TS 1976 No 3 (in 
force 22 March 1976), as amended by Protocol 1, 11 January 1988, CTS 1991 No 37 (in 
force 26 November 1991) and Protocol 2, 12 January 2001, Can TS 2003 No 11 (in force 
30 April 2003) [Canada-US Treaty]. 
35  Phillip M. Saunders et al, Kindred’s International Law: Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied in 
Canada, 9th ed (Toronto: Edmond Publishing, 2019) at 155. 
36  A modest amount of information can be found at Canada, Department of Justice, About 
the International Assistance Group (Ottawa: DOJ, last modified 20 October 2016), online: 
<www.justice.gc.ca/eng/cj-jp/emla-eej/about-apropos.html> [perma.cc/L222-XHYN]. 
37  “Bill C-4, An Act respecting non-for-profit corporations and certain other 
corporations”, 2nd reading, House of Commons Debates, 40-2, No 010 (6 February 2009) 
at 1200 (Hon Lawrence Cannon), online: <www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/e 
n/40-2/house/sitting-10/hansard> [perma.cc/5LTK-M2RD] (Foreign Affairs Minister 
Lawrence Cannon tabled a new Canada-Italy extradition treaty, without any comment 
being made). 
38  Gib Van Ert has commented that “Canada’s practices in the conclusion and domestic 
performance of treaties remains scandalously opaque”. See Gib Van Ert, “POGG and 
Treaties: The Role of International Agreements in National Concern Analysis” (8 June 
2020), online (blog): Gib Van Ert <gibvanert.com/2020/06/08/the-role-of-internationa 
l-agreements-in-national-concern-analysis/> [perma.cc/99MU-6J7K]. 
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It is worth highlighting, then, that extradition proceedings will 
necessarily deprive individuals (including Canadian citizens) of their liberty, 
at the hands of both the Canadian government and a foreign state; yet no 
meaningful public consultation has ever been conducted by the government 
as to whether we should have extradition treaties with particular states, nor 
what conditions should be placed on extraditions completed under those 
treaties. Even Prime Minister Trudeau’s sudden announcement in 
September 2016 that Canada would begin negotiating an extradition treaty 
with China seemed to emerge from some government back room and only 
saw any debate because it was so publicly controversial.39 
B. The Extradition Act 1999 
Extradition treaties (like all treaties) are not automatically part of 
Canadian law but must be implemented by way of statute. In the case of 
extradition, the Extradition Act implements all of Canada’s extradition 
arrangements and provides a “complete code” of procedure for extradition 
to and from Canada. Prior to 1999, extradition was completed under two 
different statutes: the old Extradition Act, which was modelled on the British 
statute, and the now-repealed Fugitive Offenders Act, which contained a 
streamlined extradition process for Commonwealth partners. The current 
Act was brought in as an effort to address what the federal government 
identified as inefficiencies and difficulties in Canada’s ability to extradite to 
foreign states. A particular problem was said to be issues faced by foreign 
states with civil justice systems, which had difficulty meeting the evidentiary 
requirements of the Canadian legislation – to the point where some partner 
states were discouraged from making requests at all.40 Generally speaking, 
the goal was to replace Canada’s “antiquated” extradition system in order 
to respond to the new realities of transnational crime and, rhetorically at 
least, ensure Canada did not become a haven for criminals. 
The new legislation was explicitly designed to create a more streamlined 
and simplified “three-phase process” for extraditions from Canada: (1) the 
        
39  Steven Chase & Robert Fife, “Justin Trudeau defends extradition treaty talks with 
China”, The Globe and Mail (21 September 2016), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com 
/justin-trudeau-defends-extradition-treaty-talks-with-china> [perma.cc/ZR7S-JQFB]. 
40  Elaine F. Krivel et al, A Practical Guide to Canadian Extradition (Toronto: Carswell, 2002) 
at 11. An excellent account of how the new Act was ushered in can be found in 
McMahon, supra note 14. McMahon notes, in particular, that while there was little 
doubt that the procedural machinery needed updating, the evidence of problems 
experienced by requesting states was overstated. 
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“Authority to Proceed” (ATP); (2) judicial committal or discharge; and (3) 
ministerial surrender or refusal to surrender for extradition.41 The front end 
of the process is the ATP phase in which lawyers at the IAG receive and 
evaluate the extradition request to ensure it complies with the relevant 
treaty and, in particular, that the offence for which the individual is sought 
is an extraditable offence. The latter point requires that there be “double 
criminality” (i.e., that the offence involved is one that is punishable up to a 
certain threshold by both Canada and the requesting state).42 The Canadian 
offence that corresponds to the foreign offence must be explicitly identified. 
The ATP itself is issued by the Minister and empowers staff counsel to, inter 
alia, have the individual arrested and seek an order “committing” them for 
extradition.  
The committal phase, which is the focus of this article, requires a 
hearing before a superior court judge who will essentially decide two things: 
(1) whether the person before the court is actually the person sought and 
(2) whether the evidence that has been presented by the requesting state 
would be sufficient to have a person committed for trial in Canada (for the 
Canadian offence identified in the ATP) if the conduct had occurred in 
Canada.43 While, historically, the requesting state would have had to 
actually adduce evidence that made out a prima facie case, the 1999 Act 
brought in an innovation: requesting states are permitted to submit a 
“Record of the Case” (ROC) which is essentially a summary of the evidence 
underpinning the request. It must be accompanied by the certification of a 
judicial or prosecuting authority of the requesting state, to the effect that 
the evidence summarized is indeed available for trial, and either is sufficient 
under that state’s law to justify prosecution or was gathered in accordance 
with that state’s law.44 This provision was seemingly designed to 
accommodate states (primarily from civil law traditions45) whose evidentiary 
        
41  See MM, supra note 9 at paras 16–26. 
42  Either a minimum of two years imprisonment under section 3 of the Act or whatever 
the governing treaty says—for example, Article 2 of the Canada-US Treaty, supra note 36, 
provides for extradition where the offence is punishable by one year or more of 
imprisonment. 
43  Act, supra note 6, s 29(1)(a). 
44  Act, supra note 6, s 33. 
45  There is a similar regime specifically provided for in the Canada-France extradition 
treaty, which pre-dates the Act. See Extradition Treaty between the Government of Canada 
and the Government of the Republic of France, Canada and France, 17 November 1988, 
Can TS 1989 No 38 (in force 1 December 1989), art 10(2)(c). 
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regimes were dissimilar to Canada’s and who would otherwise not be able 
easily to produce a prima facie case based on evidence. However, it was 
quickly adopted as the desirable approach by the U.S., Canada’s most 
frequent requesting state, and now is used in the majority of cases.46 The 
ROC regime also spares the requesting state the need to present evidence 
in court, particularly viva voce evidence which is expensive and time-
consuming. The result is that the ROCs contain what Canadian lawyers 
would call hearsay, unsworn statements and otherwise unsubstantiated 
evidence. 
The role of the committal judge is similar to, but more expansive than, 
that of a preliminary inquiry judge.47 The sufficiency of evidence test under 
paragraph 29(1)(a) still assesses whether the evidence shows a prima facie 
case, albeit with relaxed evidentiary rules, and the judge must engage in a 
“limited weighing” of the evidence (or, more accurately, the summary of the 
evidence, assuming the ROC to be true) to determine whether a reasonable 
jury, properly instructed, could convict on the evidence. Importantly, under 
the Act, the evidence in the ROC is presumed to be reliable,48 and while 
the individual sought is permitted to challenge the evidence (either 
individual items or in its entirety) on the basis of reliability, they bear the 
overall onus of rebutting this presumption (paragraph 32(1)(a)). In turn, 
that rebuttal will only be successful where the person sought demonstrates 
that the evidence is “manifestly unreliable.”49 More will be said about this 
below. 
If the person is committed for extradition, the process enters the 
“surrender phase” where the Minister of Justice makes the final decision on 
whether the individual will be extradited.50 This task has consistently been 
described by the Supreme Court as “essentially political in nature,”51 in that 
the Minister is primarily concerned with discharging Canada’s treaty 
        
46  In a minority of cases, the requesting state can lead evidence under the terms of the 
relevant extradition treaty per paragraph 32(1)(b) of the Act, supra note 6. However, it 
must still establish that the evidence exists and is available for trial (United States v Ferras, 
2006 SCC 36 at paras 57–58 [Ferras]; United Mexican States v Ortega, 2006 SCC 34). 
47  Weinstein & Dennison, supra note 33 at 215. See also Act, supra note 6, s 24(2). 
48  Ferras, supra note 48 at paras 52–56. 
49  United States v Prudenza (sub nom Anderson), 2007 ONCA 84 at para 31 [Anderson], cited 
in MM, supra note 9 at para 72. 
50  Act, supra note 6, s 40. 
51  MM, supra note 9 at para 25. 
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obligations as “a responsible member of the international community.”52 
While the decision must be Charter-compliant, it is one that is on “the 
extreme end of the… scale” and attracts an extremely deferential standard 
of review.53 This is because the Minister is exercising their capacity under 
the Crown prerogative over foreign affairs, and the courts choose to be 
circumspect. Sections 44 and 46 to 47 of the Act set out a number of 
grounds on which the Minister can refuse surrender, some of which are 
mandatory and more of which are discretionary. 
Finally, it is well-established in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence that 
the Charter applies to the entire extradition process. The Court’s preferred 
analytical lens has been section 7, which bars the state from depriving an 
individual of liberty “except in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice”, and it has developed a set of such principles that are 
tailored to both the committal54 and ministerial55 phases (the former of 
which will be dealt with here). 
Committal decisions are subject to appeal,56 and surrender decisions to 
judicial review,57 before the relevant provincial court of appeal, and both 
can end up at the Supreme Court for final disposal if granted leave. In many 
cases, both committal and surrender are challenged, and the standard 
practice is to combine both appeal and judicial review into a single hearing 
at both levels of court.58 
C. The Role of the International Assistance Group 
The IAG is a specialized division of Justice Canada which “was 
established to carry out most of the responsibilities assigned to the Minister 
of Justice under the Extradition Act and the Mutual Legal Assistance in 
Criminal Matters Act.”59 IAG acts as Canada’s “central authority”60 for all of 
        
52  Ibid. 
53  Lake v Canada (Minister of Justice), 2008 SCC 23 [Lake]. 
54  Ferras, supra note 48; MM, supra note 9. 
55  United States v Burns, 2001 SCC 7 [Burns]; Lake, supra note 55. 
56  Act, supra note 6, s 49. 
57  Ibid, s 57. 
58  Weinstein & Dennison, supra note 33. 
59  About the International Assistance Group, supra note 38.  
60  Under modern extradition practice, states create or designate a particular branch of the 
government, called a “central authority,” to deal with all incoming and outgoing 
requests in order to create efficiency and avoid the need to use diplomatic 
communication. 
14   MANITOBA LAW JOURNAL 
Canada’s international criminal cooperation activities and administers the 
government’s communication and cooperation with foreign states in this 
regard. So far as extradition goes, the IAG plays a number of roles: it 
develops extradition treaty relationships; it fields incoming requests from 
foreign states, as well as consulting and assisting them, and also presides 
over outgoing communication and requests; it obtains evidence “for use at 
home or abroad, including for use in extradition”;61 it advises regional 
Canadian counsel on international cooperation methods; and it approves 
and issues the ATP in appropriate cases. 
Most important for present purposes, IAG personnel conduct the 
litigation in the adversarial extradition proceedings. They do this either 
indirectly, by advising and instructing litigation counsel employed by Justice 
Canada62 or, in some cases, acting as counsel in those proceedings63– which 
is to say, they act as counsel for the requesting states. They also advise the 
Minister on all aspects of extradition proceedings, up to and including the 
drafting of Ministerial surrender decisions.64 In fundamental terms then, 
IAG adversarially “prosecutes” the extradition case on behalf of the Crown 
and, ultimately, the requesting state; makes the final decision regarding 
surrender; and fights any appeals or judicial reviews in court. This 
remarkable dominance of the entire process by a government agency will 
examined in Part V below. 
IV. THE JUDICIAL TASK AND ISSUES AT THAT COMMITTAL 
STAGE 
A. The Primary Problem: Legislative Interpretation 
In MM, the current leading case on the committal process, Justice 
Cromwell for the majority of the Court began the judgment by stating that 
“the extradition process serves two important objectives: the prompt 
compliance with Canada’s international obligations to our extradition 
        
61  Segal Report, supra note 16 at 34. 
62  In British Columbia and Ontario, where the extradition traffic is highest, there are 
specialist Justice Canada practice groups set up for extradition and MLAT proceedings. 
63  This occurred in Diab Sup Ct, supra note 20. The Segal Report presented this as 
“unusual” (supra note 16 at 19). 
64  Formally speaking, this is a power that is reserved for the Minister, and the Minister 
personally makes the decision upon the advice of IAG and signs it. However, the 
decisions are in substance made by IAG lawyers. See Segal Report, supra note 16 at 65.  
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partners, and the protection of the rights of the person sought.”65 On the 
current state of the law, however, there is an imbalance between these two 
“objectives.” The Extradition Act is the driver of the “extradition process,” 
and the courts have consistently found that its sole objective is to facilitate 
extradition. Protection of the rights of the person sought has been a 
secondary objective at best, de-emphasized by the Crown and applied only 
half-heartedly by the courts. From this standpoint, I will argue that the 
committal process is unfair. 
In the course of two decades of caselaw regarding the committal process, 
the Crown has urged upon the courts – mostly successfully – two related 
themes: (1) that the primary interpretive principle the courts should apply 
to the Extradition Act is the safeguarding and promotion of international 
comity between Canada and its extradition partner states, and (2) that 
Parliament intended extradition to be an expeditious and summary process, 
informed as little as possible by Canadian criminal law fundamentals. I will 
briefly explain each of these in turn. 
On the first theme, extradition, of course, is a tool of inter-state 
cooperation that has the single goal of suppressing transnational crime, and 
the achievement of this goal depends on states making effective use of 
extradition treaties and arrangements. The 1999 Act was explicitly drafted 
with this in mind,66 and thus it is not surprising that nearly every reported 
extradition decision makes reference to some variant of Canada 
maintaining “international comity” by being a good extradition partner.67 
In fact, comity is basically the only interpretive principle that the courts, 
urged on by the Crown, have seen fit to use. 
On the second theme, the Supreme Court and lower courts have 
constantly emphasized that extradition cannot be efficacious unless it is 
expeditious, and that expedition, in turn, requires the procedural 
machinery to be kept to a minimum. The most consistent expression of this 
emphasis is that, as the majority noted in MM, “the extradition process is 
not a trial and, as the Court said nearly three decades ago, it should never 
be permitted to become one.”68 The committal process, in particular, is a 
        
65  MM, supra note 9 at para 1. 
66  Krivel et al, supra note 42 at 10–13. 
67  United States v Dynar, [1997] 2 SCR 462 at para 122, 147 DLR (4th) 399. 
68  MM, supra note 9 at para 2. 
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“modest screening device,”69 and fairness in this process does not require a 
(criminal) trial. Instead, it simply requires “that there is sufficient evidence 
to justify putting the person on trial.”70 
The procedural machinery will be explored below. As a preface point, 
however, this matrix of emphasis is perhaps to be expected since, despite 
the fact that the goal of the Act is to render people to face criminal trials, 
the process created is fundamentally a non-criminal, judicial-administrative 
law hybrid that incorporates certain criminal procedure machinery only by 
necessity.71 In roughly the same manner that a preliminary inquiry judge 
would do, the committal judge determines, essentially in the abstract, 
whether the evidence proffered by the requesting state would justify 
committal for trial in Canada. The presumption of innocence does not 
apply, and any questions regarding defences are left for the actual criminal 
trial to be held in the requesting state. The push and pull throughout the 
case law, however, reflects consistent effort by the defence bar to have the 
courts take into account that the entire ambit of the process is the 
deprivation of liberty of the person sought and to inject an appropriate 
amount of gravity and procedural protection into it – an effort that has been 
largely unsuccessful. 
During the following examination of issues that are raised by the 
committal process, it is worth bearing in mind that the Crown’s insistence 
on these two themes is fundamentally accurate. The structure of the Act and 
the way the process has played out supports the view that Parliament did 
indeed intend to provide for an expeditious process that was primarily 
geared toward making sure extradition requests were fulfilled. Of course, 
though Parliament held the pen, it was guided by the hand of Justice 
Canada which formulated the legislation and the policy goals that underpin 
it, steered the Act through the legislative process, and continues to negotiate 
and administer the treaties and determinedly pursue extradition, all with 
minimal public input. The Act is fundamentally a piece of law enforcement 
legislation because it was made by law enforcers. The question for 
Canadians is whether this is as it should be or whether change needs to be 
made. 
        
69  Ibid at para 2; United States v Yang (2001), 56 OR (3d) 52 at paras 47, 64, 86, DLR (4th) 
337 (ONCA), cited in MM, supra note 9 at paras 38, 53, 61. 
70  MM, supra note 9 at para 61.  
71  See Joanna Harrington, “Extradition, Assurances and Human Rights: Guidance from 
the Supreme Court of Canada in India v. Badesha” (2019) 88 SCLR (2d) 273. 
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B. Admissibility and Sufficiency of Evidence: Re-
Invigorating Ferras 
1. Changes to Committal Under the 1999 Act: From Shephard to MM 
To understand properly the central fairness issues with the committal 
process, it is important to review the changes made by the 1999 Act. In a 
detailed overview, Professor Anne Warner La Forest wrote that extradition 
law had always rested on maintaining a balance between safeguarding the 
liberty of the person sought and state interest in international 
cooperation.72 In Canada, historically the committal process had achieved 
this, more or less, by maintaining a procedural alignment between 
extradition proceedings and the preliminary inquiry; the committal hearing 
was in fact prescribed by the former legislation to be conducted “as nearly 
as may be”73 to a preliminary inquiry. In keeping with the approach of most 
common law jurisdictions, the requesting state was required to present a 
prima facie case74 which, importantly, had to be based on evidence that was 
admissible under Canadian law.75 The trickiest point was around hearsay, 
to which common law jurisdictions like Canada took a restrictive approach 
but was used liberally in other states. Since the calling of live witnesses was 
too expensive and time-consuming to be justified or practical for extradition 
purposes, first-person sworn/affirmed statements or affidavits were 
admissible. However, second- and third-hand hearsay was not admissible, 
“ensur[ing] that the evidence is reliable and that the person giving it has 
received a warning that he or she must speak truthfully.”76 
The test for committal, originally laid out US v Shephard,77 was the same 
as that which governed preliminary inquiries: if there was evidence that 
offered some form of proof on each element of the offence (i.e. sufficiency), 
and assuming that evidence to be true (i.e. reliability), the judge asked 
whether a reasonable trier of fact, properly instructed, could find the 
accused guilty. The judge did not weigh the evidence, nor was the defence 
        
72  La Forest, supra note 7. 
73  Extradition Act, RS 1985, c E-23, s 13 (repealed by the Act, supra note 6, s 129).  
74  See Geoff Gilbert, Transnational Fugitive Offenders in International Law: Extradition and 
Other Mechanisms (New York: Springer Publishing, 1998) at 119–27. 
75  This included certain modest relaxations of Canadian evidence law in the old Act to 
accommodate the extradition setting. 
76  La Forest, supra note 7 at para 57. 
77  United States v Shephard, [1977] 2 SCR 1067, 70 DLR (3d) 136. 
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allowed to challenge its reliability. However, as Professor La Forest pointed 
out, this was unnecessary since the evidence was admissible under Canadian 
law and thus to assume its reliability was reasonable and fair.78 This 
structure allowed Canada to strike the balance between comity and the 
safeguarding of liberty – the trial system of the foreign state, which might 
be very different from Canada’s, was not questioned or undermined, but 
Canada would only extradite a person where they could be put on trial in 
similar circumstances in Canada. This was, in fact, the substance of the 
double criminality principle. 
The 1999 Act changed this machinery fundamentally, particularly with 
the introduction of the ROC. The policy justification often proffered was 
that providing evidence in a form admissible under Canadian law resulted 
in extradition being difficult or even impossible for requesting states which 
had civil law systems, not least because hearsay evidence was used extensively 
and the concept of sworn statements was not known to those systems.79 The 
solution was adopting the ROC which, as noted earlier, is a summary of 
evidence supporting the charge that is certified either to be available for trial 
in the requesting state or at least gathered in accordance with that state’s 
law. The evidence described in the ROC is presumed reliable. The analogy 
to a preliminary inquiry was kept, subject to “any modifications that the 
circumstances require.”80 
Importantly, the test for committal did not change and the Shephard test 
was essentially codified in paragraph 29(1)(a) of the Act. As Professor La 
Forest noted, this approach amounted to “retaining the prima facie standard 
but relaxing the admissibility standard.”81 She argued that this upset the 
balance between liberty and comity in a way that de-legitimized the process: 
The logic of Shephard in terms of reliability does not apply once admissibility is 
relaxed to the point of allowing second and third hand hearsay in one process and 
not in the other. It is true that under the new Act, the record of the case must be 
certified by a judicial or prosecuting authority in the requesting state, but that 
would not be sufficient to warrant admissibility of the evidence in Canadian 
proceedings. There is thus no longer an alignment between preliminary 
        
78  La Forest, supra note 7 at para 72. 
79  Both Professor La Forest and Professor McMahon are highly critical of the solidity of 
this rationale and the quality and amount of evidence which was put forward in support 
of it. See especially McMahon, supra note 14 where she carefully reviews the process of 
the Bill through Parliament. 
80  Act, supra note 6, s 24(2). 
81  La Forest, supra note 7 at para 103.  
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proceedings and extradition proceedings in Canada. It was this balance that 
formed the basis for the statements in Charter decisions that the extradition 
hearing was generally in accordance with fundamental justice. If it is accepted that 
it is a basic tenet of our legal system that a person cannot be bound over for trial 
in this jurisdiction based upon the kind of evidence provided for in the new Act, 
then it can be postulated that, in general, it is contrary to fundamental justice to 
extradite a person, who may well be a Canadian national, to a requesting state 
based upon that evidence to face trial in that country.82 
Essentially, Canada had gone from a system where committal should be 
ordered based on evidence that was admissible under Canadian law, to one 
where committal should be ordered based on the fact that evidence could 
be shown to exist even though that evidence would not necessarily have 
been admissible under Canadian law83 and could not realistically be tested. 
“Indeed,” Professor La Forest memorably remarked, “other than as a matter 
of form, it is difficult to understand why the judicial role has been retained 
in the new Act, as the extradition judge has little, if anything, to do.”84 
For some years after the Act’s coming into force, the Crown advanced 
the argument that the sufficiency test had not changed from Shephard and 
that, despite the changes regarding admissibility of evidence, the committal 
judge had no discretion to review, weigh, or evaluate the evidence put 
forward in the ROC. In a set of constitutional challenges led by the case of 
R v Ferras,85 however, the Supreme Court took up the substance of Professor 
La Forest’s suggestion that the new Act had swung the balance over into 
unconstitutional territory. Noting that “[t]he Act is silent on whether the 
judge has a residual discretion to exclude evidence that is unreliable or 
dangerous,”86 Chief Justice McLachlin for the Court held that using the 
preliminary inquiry structure as an analogue for the committal hearing 
could not, as a matter of “fundamental justice” under section 7 of the 
Charter, be pushed as far as the Shephard test permitted. It might be 
acceptable to deprive trial judges of the ability to weigh or evaluate evidence 
        
82  Ibid at para 73. 
83  As Botting notes, “[s]ince the summary of evidence set out in the record of the case is 
hearsay – if not double or triple hearsay – it clearly would not be ‘admissible under 
Canadian law’ except by virtue of section 32”. See Gary Botting, “The Supreme Court 
‘Decodes’ the Extradition Act: Reading Down the Law in Ferras and Ortega” (2007) 32:2 
Queen’s LJ 446 at 468 (QL). 
84  La Forest, supra note 7 at para 130.  
85  Ferras, supra note 48. 
86  Ibid at para 37. 
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in the context of committal for trial in Canada because evidence was 
admitted in a preliminary inquiry “according to the domestic rules of 
evidence, with all of the inherent guarantees of threshold reliability that 
those rules entail.”87 In the extradition context, however, this protection was 
not present, which would “deprive the subject of his or her constitutional 
right to a meaningful judicial determination before the subject is sent out 
of the country and loses his or her liberty.”88 This, the Court ruled, was 
constitutionally infirm: 
[T]he combined effect of the relevant provisions (ss. 29, 32 and 33 of the Act) may 
be to deprive the person sought of the independent hearing and evaluation 
required by the principles of fundamental justice applicable to extradition. If the 
extradition judge possesses neither the ability to declare unreliable evidence 
inadmissible nor to weigh and consider the sufficiency of the evidence, committal 
for extradition could occur in circumstances where committal for trial in Canada 
would not be justified. I take as axiomatic that a person could not be committed 
for trial for an offence in Canada if the evidence is so manifestly unreliable that it 
would be unsafe to rest a verdict upon it. It follows that if a judge on an extradition 
hearing concludes that the evidence is manifestly unreliable, the judge should not 
order extradition under s. 29(1). Yet, under the current state of the law 
in Shephard, it appears that the judge is denied this possibility.89 
It is worth pausing at this point to observe that in support of these 
points, Chief Justice McLachlin pointedly cited Professor La Forest’s 
criticism that the committal judges “have nothing left to do.”90 “The judge,” 
she wrote, “becomes a rubber stamp.”91 One might conclude that this 
unconstitutional and unfair hollowing out of judicial process was, in fact, a 
deliberate product of the 1999 Extradition Act’s design or, at the very least, 
a product of the Crown’s litigation strategy in proceedings under the Act.92 
To remedy the situation, the Court read down subsection 29(1) such 
that it granted the committal judge discretion “to refuse to extradite on 
insufficient evidence such as where the reliability of the evidence certified 
is successfully impeached or where there is no evidence, by certification or 
        
87  Ibid para 48. 
88  Ibid at para 47. 
89  Ibid at para 40. 
90  La Forest supra note 7 at 172, cited in Ferras supra note 48 at para 41. The Court also 
cited similar remarks made by Gary Botting in Extradition Between Canada and the United 
States (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2005) at 8. 
91  Ferras, supra note 48 at para 41. 
92  This is borne out by a review of the Respondent Factum in Ferras, in which the Crown 
resolutely denied any Charter or fairness issues with these provisions. See United States 
of America v Ferras, Supreme Court of Canada File No. 30211, Factum of the Respondent. 
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otherwise, that the evidence is available for trial.”93 In terms of impeaching 
the reliability of the evidence, the person sought could lead their own 
evidence or make arguments about the evidence in the ROC. Informed in 
this way, the judge could “engage in a limited weighing of evidence to 
determine whether there was a plausible case.”94 However, the evidence was 
presumed reliable and the challenge could only be successful if the evidence 
was “so defective or appears so unreliable that the judge concludes it would 
be dangerous or unsafe to convict”95 or (in the phrase that ultimately shaped 
the jurisprudence) the evidence could be shown to be “manifestly 
unreliable.”96 Notably, the Court did not go as far as Professor La Forest 
might have preferred, as the presumption of reliability essentially meant 
automatic admissibility in the absence of challenge from the person sought; 
the American ROC in Ferras itself featured hearsay that came from 
unsavoury witnesses. 
While early commentary hailed the Ferras framework as bringing much-
needed rigour to the committal decision,97 the Crown immediately went 
about narrowing the window of fundamental justice that Ferras had tried to 
open. It found success and a sympathetic ear with Justice Doherty in the 
case of United States of America v Anderson.98 While conceding that Ferras had 
“turned a new jurisprudential page in the law of extradition,”99 Justice 
Doherty characterized the scrutiny of the requesting state’s evidence as a 
“limited qualitative evaluation” that: 
[D]oes not envision weighing competing inferences that may arise from the 
evidence. It does not contemplate that the extradition judge will decide whether a 
witness is credible or his or her evidence is reliable. Nor does it call upon the 
extradition judge to evaluate the relative strength of the case put forward by the 
requesting state. There is no power to deny extradition in cases that appear to the 
extradition judge to be weak or unlikely to succeed at trial.100 
        
93  Ferras, supra note 48 at para 50. 
94  Ibid at para 54. The “limited weighing” predominantly refers to testing the inferences 
sought to be established by circumstantial evidence pursuant to R v Arcuri, 2001 SCC 
54. 
95  Ibid at para 40. 
96  Ibid. 
97  See Botting, “The Supreme Court ‘Decodes’ the Extradition Act”, supra note 85. 
98  Anderson, supra note 51. See also United States v Thomlinson, 2007 ONCA 42. 
99  Anderson, supra note 51 at para 26. 
100  Ibid at para 28 [emphasis added]. 
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Evidence, he wrote, could be rendered defective or unreliable “due to 
problems inherent in the evidence itself, problems that undermine the 
credibility or reliability of the source of the evidence, or a combination of 
those two factors,” but it was only where the concerns with the evidence 
became “sufficiently powerful to justify the complete rejection of the 
evidence” that they were even “germane” to the sufficiency of evidence 
inquiry.101 The presumption of reliability could only be overcome where the 
person sought could demonstrate “fundamental inadequacies or frailties” 
in the requesting state’s evidence.”102 
Justice Doherty’s dicta in Anderson were influential in subsequent case 
law. The other most influential appellate court in extradition matters, the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal, initially resisted the tone struck by 
Anderson103 but softened its approach over time.104 The coup de grace came 
from Justice Cromwell whose judgment in MM put an authoritative seal on 
the Anderson line of case law. Stating that he “largely agree[d]” with Justice 
Doherty’s interpretation of Ferras, Justice Cromwell echoed the narrowing 
language from Anderson105 and further shrank any hope of meaningful 
evaluation of the requesting state’s evidence: 
Ferras does not call upon the extradition judge to evaluate the relative strength of 
the case put forward by the requesting state. There is no power to deny extradition 
simply because the case appears to the extradition judge to be weak or unlikely to 
succeed at trial.106 
Justice Cromwell then went on to impose an additional procedural 
hurdle to a challenge of the requesting state’s evidence. He noted that the 
task of the extradition judge was only one of limited weighing of the 
requesting state’s evidence, and that any evidence sought to be used to 
challenge reliability had to be discretely relevant to this task. Accordingly, 
before even being allowed to lead the evidence, the person sought would 
have to make “an initial showing that the proposed evidence is realistically 
capable of satisfying the high standard that must be met in order to justify 
refusing committal on the basis of unreliability of the requesting state’s 
        
101  Ibid at para 30. 
102  Ibid at para 31. 
103  United States v Graham, 2007 BCCA 345, in which Justice Donald referred to the 
Ontario Court of Appeal’s approach as “reductionist.” 
104  See e.g. United States of America v SU, 2013 BCCA 483. 
105  MM, supra note 9 at paras 71–72. 
106  Ibid at para 71. 
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evidence.”107 Analogously to a Vukelich motion,108 this “initial showing” 
could include “summaries or will-say statements or similar offers of 
proof.”109 
Justice Cromwell concluded by offering what he called “examples of 
evidence that may or may not meet the high threshold justifying a refusal of 
committal on the basis of unreliability of the evidence.” His list of examples 
which “may not” meet the high threshold (because it was “irrelevant or not 
sufficiently cogent”110) included111 evidence that: goes to witness credibility; 
attempts to establish a competing inference of innocence; attempts to 
establish a defence; or presents a “different or exculpatory account of 
events.”112 Justice Cromwell offered no specific examples of evidence that 
“may” meet the high threshold, offering instead that even the types of 
evidence he had just referred to might establish unreliability in “certain, and 
likely fairly unusual cases” if it was “of virtually unimpeachable authenticity 
and reliability.” However, such cases would be “very rare.”113 
2. Ferras and Fairness 
In my view, Ferras’s promise of restoring a meaningful screening role for 
the committal judge has evaporated. This is because the Court’s view in 
Ferras of the role played by the presumption that the ROC is reliable was 
too sanguine or even incautious. Practically speaking, rebutting the 
presumption of reliability is not only a difficult hill to scale but an 
impossible one. Individuals sought routinely challenge reliability on the 
basis of information known to them or that can be squeezed out of the ROC 
documents themselves – bearing in mind that these are tailored by the 
requesting states and the IAG and that disclosure is practically a non-starter 
– only to meet a ruling that questions regarding the reliability of the 
evidence should be handled by the trial court in the requesting state. 
        
107  Ibid at para 77. 
108  A hearing in which the court will decide whether it will even allow the accused to make 
a Charter motion. See R v Cody, 2017 SCC 31 at para 38. 
109  MM, supra note 9 at para 77. This too appears to have originated in Anderson, supra note 
51 at paras 43–46, adopted from the earlier case of R v Mach, [2006] OJ No 3204, 70 
WCB (2d) 318 (Ont Sup Ct). 
110  MM, supra note 9 at para 81. 
111  Ibid at paras 82–84. 
112  Ibid at para 84. 
113  Ibid at para 85. 
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Between them, the Ontario Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court have 
essentially interpreted Ferras out of practical existence. 
It is helpful to contextualize this argument with reference to what might 
inelegantly be referred to as the Crown’s “win/loss record” in extradition 
cases generally, and at the committal stage specifically. Anecdotally 
speaking, it is well-known among defence lawyers that arrest of a client on 
an extradition warrant means they are usually facing a process that is 
practically a fait accompli, and that the best advice the lawyer can give is to 
immediately retain local counsel in the requesting state in hope of 
negotiating a plea deal in exchange for waiving the extradition process.114 A 
well-known “joke” about extradition is that there is only one question that 
needs answering: aisle or window seat?115 In light of Hassan Diab’s wrongful 
extradition to France this “joke” seems in poor taste, yet it accurately 
captures the extent to which, at least in the perception of non-Crown people 
interested in extradition, the deck is stacked. 
This anecdotal understanding is borne out, moreover, by data. In terms 
of the broader question of whether extradition efforts by the Crown result 
in extradition, any brief look at the extradition case law would indicate that 
the overwhelming majority of challenges to extradition are lost by the 
person sought and result in “success” for the Crown.116 This figure would 
not take into account those cases where extradition is not contested by the 
person sought, which would make the Crown’s “success” rate higher still. 
In the wake of Hassan Diab’s return from France, IAG disclosed statistics 
which indicated that individuals sought are in fact surrendered in 90% of 
cases.117 
More to the point of this article, however, is that a look specifically at 
reported committal decisions shows that Justice Cromwell aptly described 
successful challenges to the requesting state’s case as “very rare.” As one 
        
114  See Weinstein & Dennison, supra note 33, c 4. 
115  Roger Clark, “Clark: Results of inquiry into Hassan Diab’s extradition must be made 
public now”, Ottawa Citizen (17 July 2019), online: <ottawacitizen.com/opinion/colum 
nists/clark-results-of-inquiry-into-hassan-diabs-extradition-must-be-made-public-now> [p 
erma.cc/TGX2-VFTT]. 
116  Whether it is even appropriate to refer to a completed extradition as a “win” or 
“success” for the Crown is an interesting question, which is taken up in Section IV 
below. 
117  Lisa Laventure & David Cochrane, “Canada’s high extradition rate spurs calls for 
reform”, CBC News (30 May 2018), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/politics/extradition-
arrest-canada-diab-1.4683289> [perma.cc/Z9CQ-45HX]. 
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reliable text notes,118 successful challenges at the committal hearing are rare, 
and successful appeals of committal orders are rarer still. Moreover, in 2017 
I directed a study of 198 post-Ferras committal decisions reported between 
2006 and 2017, which revealed only 16 successful challenges among all of 
the cases.119 
It is important to acknowledge that these numbers represent a crude 
measure of a more nuanced situation. While this is an unpopular view 
among defence lawyers, it seems sensible to conclude that a strong plurality, 
if not a majority, of extradition requests are well-founded and rest on a 
reasonable evidential record. Moreover, if an extradition case is put forward 
by the IAG for a committal hearing, then this means that the ROC has been 
evaluated – in light of both the relevant treaty and the Act – and the Crown 
has a certain amount of confidence in the overall quality of the case. The 
IAG notes publicly that it is responsible for Canada’s communications and 
dealings with its extradition partners,120 and it is reasonable to infer (and 
has been anecdotally indicated to me) that weaker or ill-founded requests 
are either screened out or sent back to the requesting state for repair. On 
this logic then, a simple request-to-committal ratio does not account for the 
legal strength of those cases that actually proceed through the process. 
However, on the specific issue of the committal test, a look at the 16 
successful cases from the above-noted survey is revealing. In a strong 
majority of them, committal was not refused because the requesting state’s 
evidence (almost always in an ROC) was – in the language of Ferras – 
“defective or unreliable,” but because evidence was simply not present on 
one or more elements of the charged offence. For example, in Kamaldin the 
allegation was that the six persons sought had engaged in telemarketing 
        
118  Weinstein & Dennison, supra note 33. 
119  United States of America v Kamaldin, 2016 QCCS 6228; United States of America v Toren, 
2012 BCSC 1655; United States v Yu, 2011 ONSC 2777; Hungary (Republic) v Valde, 
2011 ONSC 328; Hungary (Republic) v Pataki, 2010 ONSC 2663; United States v 
Gillingham, [2007] OJ No 4402, 75 WCB (2d) 438 (Ont Sup Ct); United States v Laird, 
2010 ONSC 1553; Anderson v United States, 2006 QCCS 4211; United States v Cheema, 
2007 BCCA 342; Pelchat c Canada, 2008 QCCA 74; DiRienzo c Canada, 
2005CarswellQue 13334; United States of America v Viscomi, 2015 ONCA 484; United 
States of America v Aneja, 2012 ONSC 4062; United States of America v Robertson, 2012 
BCSC 1800; United States v Walker, 2011 BCCA 110; Seifert v Italy (Republic), 2007 
BCCA 420 [Seifert CA]. In some cases, the challenges were only partly successful, and 
the individual was committed on other charges. 
120  “About the International Assistance Group”, supra note 38. 
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fraud, but for one of the six, Iacino, the only evidence was that he had 
visited the site of the operation once and was there when arrests were 
executed; there were no fingerprints or any other evidence of his 
participation in the offences. In three other fraud cases (Valde, Pataki, and 
Gillingham), evidence of mens rea was missing from the requesting state’s case 
as to some of the persons sought. In Pelchat, evidence of the actus reus of 
manufacturing a controlled substance was missing, as was evidence of aiding 
and abetting the production. In Di Rienzo, two of the five people sought 
were discharged because the evidence did not show proof of their 
knowledge of the conspiracies for which they were sought; a similar 
discharge resulted in Cheema. In Aneja, the person sought was committed 
on several charges relating to a fraud investigation but discharged on 
obstruction of justice because his impugned statements did not relate to the 
investigation itself, and there was therefore a gap in evidence on the actus 
reus of the offence. In Walker, there was so little information relating to an 
alleged eyewitness identification that the committal judge could not even 
determine sufficiency.121 In Seifert, the person sought was committed on a 
number of charges but discharged on one for which there was no evidence 
of causation and another for which there was no evidence of causation or 
identity.122 
Some of the cases show a mixture of a lack of evidence and “defective 
and unreliable” evidence. In Yu, one of the persons sought, Chuck, was 
discharged because the evidence in the ROC purporting to implicate him 
in the charges was a mixture of mistaken identification, inconsistent 
inferences, bad translation, and baseless assertions by investigators. In Laird, 
the person sought was accused of having drugged and sexually assaulted the 
victim, but there was no evidence of how the victim had ingested the drug 
and the Crown’s inferences were, at best, speculation. In Anderson, the judge 
struck summaries of Canadian-gathered wiretap evidence from the ROC 
because it had not been led in the hearing, as required under the Act, and, 
        
121  It appears Walker was eventually extradited when a revised ROC was submitted. See 
United States v Walker, 2011 BCCA 110. 
122  Seifert v Italy (Republic), 2003 BCSC 1317. Strictly speaking, this was a pre-Ferras ruling, 
insofar as the committal judge’s decision came before Ferras was released. However, if 
anything, the committal judge applied an even more Crown-friendly test than Ferras 
(see paras 20–22). The Court of Appeal in Seifert CA, supra note 121 did a de novo 
committal assessment using Ferras but upheld these two discharges without comment. 
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as a result, the case suffered from a total absence of proof regarding some of 
the persons sought.123 
In all of these cases, the challenged evidence was fairly hopeless; even 
bearing in mind the challenges of dealing with authorities in requesting 
states and the development of evidentiary records, one wonders why the 
Crown went forward. In any event, Ferras promised that the person sought 
would have the opportunity to challenge weak evidence, but what the case 
law shows is this: all the law truly seems to provide is the much narrower 
opportunity, in cases where there really is no evidence, to point it out. Other 
reliability issues with the requesting state’s evidence, no matter how grave, 
are simply left for the requesting state’s trial courts to sort out. It also raises 
the possibility that after the constriction of Ferras between Anderson and 
MM, the window of fairness for the person sought is so narrow that we must 
be fearful that wrongful extraditions are happening. 
This is not to say that our extradition process is itself wholly toxic; by 
analogy, we do not mistrust the entire criminal justice system because we 
know there are problems with wrongful convictions. However, in the latter 
space, the Supreme Court of Canada, appellate courts, and successive 
government inquiries have shaped the common law and pushed 
Parliamentary reform to deal with the problem. In the extradition space, the 
Crown-designed process is accepted, mostly uncritically, by the courts, and 
reform proposals do not attract interest. 
If the examples cited above are not completely convincing on this point, 
there is no better support for this argument than the Diab case. The 
evidence in the French ROC was mostly geared toward identifying an 
individual known as “Panadriyu” as the bomber, and the case came down 
to a handwriting analysis report by a French expert which purported to link 
Diab’s handwriting to samples of handwriting suspected to be that of 
Panadriyu. The reliability of the report was attacked by three defence 
experts, and among the committal judge’s findings were that the report 
“ha[d] been shown to be based on some questionable methods and on an 
analysis that seems very problematic”124 and was “susceptible to a great deal 
of criticism and attack;”125 it was “convoluted, very confusing, [and] with 
        
123  See United States of America v Fraser, 2017 BCCA 136; United States of America v Tahvili, 
2008 BCCA 359. 
124  Diab Sup Ct, supra note 20 at para 118. 
125  Ibid at para 120. 
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conclusions that are suspect.”126 However, relying on Anderson, the judge 
found that he had no choice but to order committal; despite these “major 
weaknesses,” choosing between competing expert views was ultimately the 
task of the foreign trial court and, somehow, the presumption of reliability 
was not overcome.127 The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, noting that 
the expert evidence could only have been “manifestly unreliable” if it was 
“devoid of reliability and of utility to the fact finder.”128 
With respect, it is difficult to imagine a case where evidence proffered 
by the requesting state was more “devoid of reliability and utility,” and yet 
it was on the basis of this report that Hassan Diab was extradited to France 
to face a prosecutorial case that, as noted above, ultimately fell apart. This 
case therefore demonstrates two interlocking problems. First, if the 
“questionable,” “problematic,” “convoluted,” “confusing,” and “suspect” 
evidence in Diab was not manifestly unreliable, then arguably the test 
cannot actually be met. If there is any evidence, regardless of how poor or 
suspect, then the trial court in the requesting state is the appropriate place 
deal with its problems. Canada’s courts are truly applying the old Shephard 
test and just calling it by another name. 
Second, if one accepts that the test has been correctly stated and is being 
correctly applied in law (in cases like Diab and MM), then it is acceptable 
for Canadians to be extradited on the basis of evidence that is 
“questionable,” “problematic,” “convoluted,” “confusing,” and “suspect” – 
and by way of a process in which it is essentially impossible meaningfully to 
challenge that evidence and bring out its weakness. Surely, such an unfair 
process is not in line with “fundamental justice” such that it is acceptable 
to Canadians. In Ferras the Supreme Court promised a “meaningful judicial 
determination,”129 but individuals like Hassan Diab did not receive and are 
not receiving it. Compliance with the principles of fundamental justice 
under section 7 of the Charter demands better. Since, as Justice Cromwell 
wrote in MM, “[t]here is no power to deny extradition simply because the 
case appears to the extradition judge to be weak or unlikely to succeed at 
trial,”130 then Diab’s case shows that such a power needs to be created. 
        
126  Ibid at para 121. 
127  Ibid at paras 122–23. 
128  Diab CA, supra note 22 at para 126. 
129  Ferras, supra note 48 at para 26. 
130  MM, supra note 9 at para 71. 
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3. Efficiency and Expeditiousness 
This problem is compounded by the insistence in the extradition 
jurisprudence that extradition is intended to be “expeditious and efficient”, 
even summary in nature – which infects not only what scrutiny is to be given 
to the requesting state’s case but, generally, how fair the committal hearing 
must be in order to be Charter-compliant. The most currently authoritative 
version of this can be found in MM. Charged with abducting her children, 
Messina had argued that the defence of necessity would be available to her 
if the conduct had occurred in Canada, as she had been helping her 
children to flee their abusive father, and thus double criminality could not 
be made out. For the majority, Justice Cromwell took the opportunity to 
reinforce what he referred to as “long-settled principles about the 
extradition process,”131 which centred around the theme that 
“expeditiousness and efficiency” mean that “an extradition hearing is not a 
trial and it should never be permitted to become one.”132 This weighed 
against the argument that defences could even be considered at the 
committal stage since committal had fundamentally the same limited 
function as a preliminary inquiry, which is to determine whether there is 
any evidence that justified committal for trial. Defences, Justice Cromwell 
wrote, “have never formed part of the test for committal to trial in the 
preliminary inquiry context,” and to allow consideration of them “would 
fundamentally change the nature of the extradition hearing, making it more 
akin to a trial.”133 Ferras, he conceded, had expanded the scope of the 
committal judge’s powers somewhat due to its requirement that the judge 
be permitted to engage in a limited weighing of the requesting state’s 
evidence. However, this did not expand the issues to which the judge was 
confined to considering: 
Ferras’s insistence on a meaningful judicial determination by the extradition judge 
speaks only to the rigour that an extradition judge must bring to the assessment of 
the evidence. Ferras did not — indeed could not — change by judicial decree the 
statutory requirement that the requesting state has only to show that the record 
would justify committal for trial in Canada. The committal for trial process has 
never been concerned with possible defences on which the accused bears an 
        
131  Ibid at para 41. 
132  Ibid at para 64. 
133  Ibid at para 86. 
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evidential or persuasive burden and Ferras provides no support for any 
fundamental change to this statutory test for committal.134 
 A three-judge dissent led by Justice Abella argued that any meaningful 
application of the concept of “double criminality” meant that the committal 
judge must take into account clear evidence showing that the person sought 
has a defence available. While Justice Cromwell responded – correctly in 
my view – that this did damage to the statutory language that clearly 
confined the committal process and any defence-side evidence to the 
firmness of the requesting state’s evidence,135 Justice Abella’s reasons were 
grounded in Ferras’s fundamental holding that the committal process is only 
Charter-compliant if there is “meaningful judicial assessment” of the 
evidence. She wrote: 
A meaningful judicial determination of whether the double criminality 
requirement is met should not be sacrificed on the altar of potential concerns of 
expediency, comity and cost. These concerns are adequately addressed in the 
existing extradition process and not undermined by consideration of the viability 
of a [necessity] defence. In any event, they must be counterbalanced against the 
need for a meaningful judicial assessment of the case based on the evidence and 
the law so that the liberty interests of the person sought for extradition are fully 
respected and protected.136 
The dissenting argument has much to commend. It is reasonable to say 
that extradition should not become a trial, but if it is to comport with basic 
fairness, neither does it need to be the furthest thing from a trial. Allowing 
consideration of defences might depart from the preliminary inquiry 
structure upon which committal is based, but as the Court itself pointed 
out in Ferras, the Act does not demand slavish adherence to that structure.137 
If compliance with the principles of fundamental justice could justify 
expanding the scope of evidentiary consideration as a “meaningful judicial 
process,” it could safely justify including consideration of defences as well. 
It is worth remembering that preliminary inquiries (a fully criminal 
procedure) and extradition (a process Crown personnel insist on referring 
to as “civil”) may have technically similar goals but produce different results. 
A person who is committed for trial after a preliminary inquiry is going to 
face a trial within the Canadian criminal justice system, in which we are 
confident. A person extradited faces consequences which are “more 
        
134  Ibid at para 66. 
135  Ibid. 
136  Ibid at para 230. 
137  Ferras, supra note 48 at para 48. See also MM, supra note 9 at para 212. 
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onerous.”138 Like Hassan Diab, this person will be sent to a foreign state 
where they may never have been139 and where they may not speak the local 
language; they may face a foreign justice system that has significant 
problems, such as prosecutors who wish to rely on secret intelligence as 
evidence or have drawn conclusions on the basis of incompetently-gathered 
evidence.140 Like Michele Messina, a defence that would be available to 
them under Canadian law may not even be available in the requesting state, 
in a case engaging the kind of gendered violence that Canada has 
committed both domestically and internationally to combat.141 
“Fundamental justice” by way of a “meaningful judicial process” may 
require a broader scope of inquiry. 
The six to three margin in MM shows, however, that challenging the 
current Crown-driven view of the extradition process – which is supported 
by decades of extradition jurisprudence – is an uphill battle. The debate in 
MM around whether defences can be considered in the committal hearing 
is emblematic of the fact that the current process, underpinned by 
overwhelming judicial acceptance of the Crown’s policy agenda, has 
essentially fetishized the mantras of “extradition cannot be a trial” and 
“extradition must be efficient.” Even if one accepts that the current system 
is defensible in terms of complying with the scheme Parliament has laid out 
in the 1999 Extradition Act, it is worth asking the hard but basic democratic 
question: now that we have seen it in action for over 20 years, is this kind 
of process actually what Canadians want? It may be, as Justice Cromwell 
wrote in MM, that “[b]asic fairness to the person sought does not require 
that the extradition process have all of the safeguards of a trial”142 but 
        
138  La Forest, supra note 7 at para 132.  
139  It is increasingly common for some states, particularly the U.S., to assert “extended 
territorial jurisdiction” and request extradition of individuals whose alleged criminal 
conduct touched U.S. territory in some way but who never left Canada. See e.g. Sheck v 
Canada (Minister of Justice), 2019 BCCA 364. There is nothing disturbing about this in 
principle, as Canada asserts the same form of jurisdiction. However, in practice, the 
U.S. has requested jurisdiction on the basis of very broad assertions of extended 
territoriality. See e.g. United States v Meng, 2020 BCSC 785. 
140  In Diab, part of the French investigation consisted of two French handwriting “experts” 
who found that an early sample of Diab’s handwriting was a match for handwriting 
suspected to be that of the bomber. It was later revealed that the sample was actually 
the handwriting of Diab’s then-wife. See Segal Report, supra note 16 at 37. 
141  MM, supra note 9 at paras 217–24 per Justice Abella. 
142  Ibid at para 53. 
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safeguards it should have. In my view, there are aspects of basic fairness 
missing from the extradition machinery which could potentially be 
remedied by changes that maintain efficiency and keep extradition from 
devolving into some kind of preliminary trial while, at the same time, do a 
more robust, effective, and Charter-compliant job of protecting the rights of 
the individual sought. If changes would mean going beyond “settled 
principles” of extradition law, then it is time to unsettle those principles. 
4. Reforming the Committal Phase: How to Right the Ship? 
This article will not provide a re-write of the Extradition Act’s provisions 
dealing with committal, though this should be done and only after scrutiny 
by a Parliamentary committee with substantial (and heretofore sorely-
lacking) public input. A judicial inquiry into the Hassan Diab case, as was 
proposed by Diab and his many supporters, would also serve to highlight 
problems and generate solutions. However, a few proposals can be offered. 
The primary focus of reform efforts should be on un-neutering the 
“meaningful judicial process” that Ferras framed as a principle of 
fundamental justice by making the system fairer to the person sought. 
Extradition can and probably should, in some sense, be expeditious, and it 
makes sense that committal should not be a preliminary attempt to litigate 
the anticipated criminal trial in the requesting state. However, 
“expeditious” does not mean “summary,” and the current formulation of 
the committal process is just that. It requires some expansion to be fair. 
The Halifax Colloquium143 has proposed a number of interlocking 
reforms that would be worth exploring. An explicit but modified invocation 
of the presumption of innocence on the process would provide balance: 
“explicit” in that it should be inserted into the Act, but “modified” in that 
it would not bring with it an obligation on the Crown to offer proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt. The idea would be to send the signal to the committal 
judge that an adjudication of guilt or innocence is sought by the Crown at 
the end of the process, and that the requesting state’s case should be 
appropriately scrutinized and some equality of arms between the Crown and 
defence actively sought. 
One way to achieve the latter goal would be to remove the presumption 
of reliability from the ROC approach and require the Crown to prove 
reliability on a balance of probabilities. Even if the threshold to be met 
could be shaped by taking into account the peculiarities of the extradition 
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context – and perhaps be slightly more modest for the Crown – this change 
would sweep away the current dysfunction around the “manifestly 
unreliable” standard. Making this exercise meaningful, in turn, could be 
accomplished by moving somewhat back in the direction of the old prima 
facie case requirement – to wit, key witness evidence could be offered in the 
form of affidavits and the affiants made available for cross-examination. 
“The purpose of the cross-examination would be to explore whether the 
witness is fundamentally reliable and not for exploring credibility simpliciter. 
This is especially important if the witness has taken a plea deal”144 or is 
otherwise what Canadian law would label a Vetrovec witness. 
To the extent that this proposal would appear regressive, unwieldy, or 
undesirable, there are 21st century solutions that would buff off the rough 
edges. Recalling that an explicit rationale for abandoning the prima facie case 
approach in the new Act was that some foreign legal systems do not have 
the capacity to generate what we recognize as sworn evidence, Canada could 
agree with the requesting state that a government official in the foreign state 
could take the witness’s affidavit in a special but brief procedure in which 
Canadian law would apply. If this seems overly complex, it is not; Canada 
already has such arrangements in place in some of its mutual legal assistance 
treaties (MLATs),145 and provisions could be inserted into existing MLATs 
or even into the extradition treaties themselves. So far as cross-examination 
goes, in post-COVID 19 times, video-conferencing is an eminently practical 
solution, and one which is, in fact, already used to allow testimony from 
foreign witnesses in domestic criminal trials.146 
Despite Murray Segal’s recommendation that ROCs be more 
“streamlined and economical” – i.e., contain even less than they currently 
do – his scrutiny of the Diab case led him to recommend that in any case 
where the requesting state intends to rely on expert reports, the reports must 
        
144  Ibid. 
145  Notably, the Canada-US treaty, supra note 34. See R v Dorsay, 2006 BCCA 117, 42 CR 
(6th) 155, leave to appeal to SCC refused, [2006] SCCA No 374. 
146  See e.g. R v S (2018), 2018 ONCA 962. The Crown’s evidence in on one war crimes 
case was led entirely via video. See Currie & Rikhof, supra note 29 at 314. Cross-
examination on affidavits via video is already happening in civil cases. See e.g. Sandhu v 
Siri Guru Nanak Sikh Gurdwara of Alberta, 2020 ABQB 359. Wagner CJC recently 
suggested its use for domestic trials. See Olivia Stefanovich, “Supreme Court chief 
justice suggests Criminal Code changes to cut into court backlogs”, CBC News (13 June 
2020), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/politics/stefanovich-chief-justice-reopening-proposal 
s-1.5604773?cmp=rss> [perma.cc/9TZQ-FL8Z]. 
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be led in evidence and not simply summarized in the ROC.147 He invoked 
in justification the findings of the Goudge Inquiry, among others, that 
untrustworthy expert opinion has played a role in wrongful convictions and 
is worthy of special scrutiny and caution.148 In light of Diab, where 
unreliable expert evidence caused a wrongful extradition, this makes good 
sense. While Segal stopped short of recommending that the reports be held 
admissible in accordance with the White Burgess test in Canadian evidence 
law (an argument that the committal court and the Court of Appeal rejected 
in Diab), this too would seem logical. Moreover, the IAG should make it 
clear to treaty partners that this kind of evidence, in particular, must 
mandatorily be disclosed for extradition purposes if it is going to be led at 
trial; this could be backed by a treaty obligation, if necessary. 
The Halifax Colloquium also proposed that the committal judge should 
admit and consider defence-side evidence on any excuse, defence, or 
justification that would be available to a person sought under either 
Canadian law or the law of the requested state. A robustly-proven defence 
might produce a discharge. In light of MM firmly slamming the door shut 
on this point, it is likely that it would need to be accomplished through 
amending the Act. However, there is a model to start with, as federal 
immigration proceedings considering criminal inadmissibility explicitly 
consider available defences and immunities.149 
Even in my mind, this is something that would have to be carefully 
calibrated given the potential for time-wasting and disruption it might 
cause. It should probably be limited to affirmative defences rather than 
simple attacks on the elements of the offence (e.g., “I did not intend to do 
it” as an attack on mens rea). It might be that the evidence would need to 
have an “air of reality” even to be considered, much as is required in 
criminal cases.150 Otherwise, it is too easy to imagine defences based on bare 
assertions (e.g., “she attacked me, it was self-defence”). A modified air of 
reality test might be applied, such that the judge would have to find that a 
reasonable jury could find the defence to be made out on a balance of 
probabilities (rather than just raising a reasonable doubt), even for those 
defences that do not require this standard of proof under Canadian law. 
        
147  Segal Report, supra note 16 at 88. 
148  Ibid at 90. 
149  Bellevue v Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2020 FC 560 at 
paras 33–34. 
150  R v Cinous, 2002 SCC 29. 
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At its most conservative, perhaps this change could apply only in cases 
like MM itself where the main problem was that the evidence disclosed a 
defence that would have been available to Messina in Canada but was not 
available to her in the requesting state. As the dissent in MM argued 
powerfully, denying a challenge in this situation flies in the face of any 
meaningful version of double criminality, if not the technical manner in 
which it currently operates. The majority justified precluding this issue from 
consideration by the committal judge by noting that it is within the purview 
of the Minister to consider it when making the surrender decision.151 
Whether the Act appropriately balances the tasks in the extradition process 
between the judicial and Ministerial phases will be the subject of a future 
article. Suffice it to say that the issue of availability of defences is, in my 
view, a predominantly legal question that belongs in the hands of a judge 
who is directed by discrete statutory language formulated by Parliament – 
and not in those of a Minister of the Crown who is making an explicitly 
“political” decision that enjoys the most deferential standard of review 
known to Canadian administrative law.152 
This point of view also reflects the reality that, so far as any meaningful 
public information could show, there are very few cases in which the 
Minister has actually refused surrender.153 Stays of surrender, even in 
meritorious cases, mostly only occur where the courts can be convinced to 
order them, and this too is rare.154 The tragic result of the MM case gives 
some measure of the reality around this and of the troubling enthusiasm for 
extradition on the Crown side, to which this paper now turns. 
V. THE ROLE OF THE CROWN 
A. Crown “Culture” 
As noted in Section III.C above, Justice Canada is responsible for 
conducting extradition proceedings on behalf of the Crown, both through 
        
151  MM, supra note 9 at paras 116–18. 
152  Lake, supra note 55. 
153  One experienced extradition practitioner described them to me as “scarce as hen’s 
teeth.” In my own decades of studying and working on extradition cases, I have only 
seen one and heard of a few others. 
154  In India v Badesha, 2018 BCCA 470 [Badesha] the Court of Appeal refused to order a 
stay even after finding an abuse of process by the Canadian Crown. 
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the IAG and litigation counsel. In this section, I will argue that part of the 
problem with how extradition proceedings generally, and the committal 
phrase in particular, are conducted is in the way that the Crown and the 
law conceive the Crown’s role and in how that role is executed. 
The Crown side of extradition is notoriously murky, a fact remarked 
upon even by the Segal Report155 which was otherwise sympathetic to the 
Crown’s role in the Diab case. However, the same Report does shed some 
light on how the Crown actually operates through the committal and 
surrender process.156 In Diab, an IAG lawyer interacted closely with the 
investigating judge in France,157 conducting and co-ordinating 
communications between French and Canadian authorities. In particular, 
this lawyer worked closely with the Canadian legal team that was actually 
litigating the committal proceedings, assisting with evidentiary and other 
requests. The litigation team itself was staffed by IAG lawyers and staff.158 
After committal, IAG counsel prepared the usual report for the Minister, 
facilitated defence submissions on surrender, provided legal advice to the 
Minister, and drafted his surrender decision. IAG counsel also litigated the 
appeal of the committal decision and the judicial review of the surrender 
decision. 
The Crown side, then, is essentially a unit, populated by lawyers and 
support staff among whom there is some differentiation of roles, but all of 
whom are working toward the same goal. Accurately articulating what that 
goal is, however, is key to understanding the true nature of the process. To 
frame it provocatively, is the goal “producing a fair result in an extradition 
proceeding,” or is it “producing extradition, at whatever cost?” 
Describing the Crown’s role accurately, in terms of how it currently 
exists, will be helpful to ground suggestions about what it should be and 
how it should be structured. A key point is that the Crown differentiates its 
        
155  Segal Report, supra note 16 at 106–08. 
156  The IAG, as noted earlier, receives and evaluates incoming extradition requests, causes 
the ATP to be issued, facilitates arrest of the person sought, and so on. See Weinstein 
& Dennison, supra note 33, c 2. 
157  Unusually in this case, the IAG lawyer, Jacques Lemire, was actually posted to France 
to play this role for Canada-France extraditions due to the historic connections between 
these states. However, IAG staff play this role from the Ottawa office as well. 
158  Again, this was slightly unusual but had to do with the fact that the proceedings were 
being conducted in Ottawa where the IAG office is located and that the case involved 
many materials in French and were more easily accessible by the fluently bilingual IAG 
staff. 
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role in extradition proceedings from the role of Crown prosecutors and 
specifically does not feel bound by prosecutors’ enhanced obligation to 
achieve fairness in proceedings and results. The Segal Report, which was 
based in part on Segal’s interviews with IAG personnel, explains this 
cogently. A Crown prosecutor, in line with traditional authority,159 is not 
acting as counsel for any particular party but is instead “a quasi-Minister of 
Justice”160 simply concerned with producing a just result and eschewing any 
notion of “winning” or “losing.” In extradition proceedings, by contrast, the 
Crown is acting as counsel for a party (specifically, the requesting state) and 
is indeed seeking a “win” for its client through “a more purely adversarial 
role”: 
Before a trial in Canada, Crowns must consider whether there is a reasonable 
prospect of conviction. They also have an obligation to evaluate the strength of 
their case at all stages of the proceedings. These types of considerations are not 
relevant to counsel for the Attorney General in extradition proceedings. These 
government lawyers are not charged with looking into the future and asking 
whether, down the line, there will be problems with the case or whether there is a 
reasonable prospect that the evidence available is capable of convincing a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, the objective of counsel for the Attorney 
General at the judicial phase is modest: can they establish a prima facie case against 
the person sought? There is good reason for this more circumscribed role. Counsel 
for the Attorney General in extradition proceedings are not building a case for 
trial. They are not responsible for and may not be knowledgeable about the trial 
procedures available in the requesting state; and, more to the point, they do not 
know what evidence will ultimately be available for trial in that country.161 
On this view, then, the Crown’s job in extradition proceedings is to 
facilitate extradition. The Crown is fighting the person sought, on behalf of 
its client. The committal phase – indeed, the entire process – is adversarial 
and, beyond complying with ethics and procedure, no holds should be 
barred. Protections for the person sought can be sought by that person; the 
system is designed to be fair and Charter-compliant, and of course the 
individual will be represented by able counsel. The nature of the process, as 
explained in the excerpt above, drives the scope of the Crown’s function. 
Or so goes the narrative. Putting aside the argument in section III  above 
(that the system is neither fairly designed nor Charter-compliant), and 
        
159  See Boucher v The Queen, [1955] SCR 16, 1954 CarswellQue 14 (SCC); R v Ahluwalia 
(2000), 149 CCC (3d) 193, 48 WCB (2d) 200 (ONCA). 
160  Segal Report, supra note 16 at 81. 
161  Ibid at 82. 
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putting aside the pressing issue of access to justice in this country and 
whether individuals sought will even have meaningful access to counsel,162 
I would argue that this is a cultural standpoint and not a legal one. This is 
not to say that it has no grounding in law – quite the contrary, in fact. This 
view of the Crown’s role is certainly facilitated by the structure of the Act 
and the Crown-side policy arguments that have found favour in the 
jurisprudence.163 However, this construction of the role has been chosen by 
the Crown for itself. It is by no means an inevitable version of what the role 
of the Crown might be in a reasonable, fair, and Charter-compliant 
extradition process. 
To say that the Crown’s role is the simple one of demonstrating a 
sufficient case for committal, and that it is divorced from any knowledge of 
or responsibility for the trial in the requesting state, is simply a policy choice. 
To repeat the mantra of “extradition is not a trial, the trial takes place in 
the requesting state” is also a choice, and this particular choice artificially 
dissociates Canada from the result of the extradition process: the ultimate 
fate of the person sought. To say “extradition is not a criminal law process” 
ignores the fact that the goal of the process is to have the person sought 
wrung through the criminal justice system of a foreign state164 and either 
into its prisons or some other hardship. Hassan Diab and Michele Messina 
learned this lesson, as they say, the hard way, and no sensible person would 
say that Canada was not instrumental to what happened to each of them. 
Putting the interests of comity at the front does, of course, drive an 
argument that this dissociation is necessary or inevitable; we must respect 
the processes of our foreign partners and so on. However, the best 
counterargument can be found in the part of the extradition process where 
comity matters most, which is the surrender phase. At that point, the 
        
162  Notably, Hassan Diab was represented by one of the most prestigious criminal defence 
lawyers in Canada, Don Bayne, who was acting pro bono. Not all individuals sought are 
so fortunate; some extradition defences are conducted by over-stretched legal aid 
counsel or local defence lawyers who might see only one extradition case in their career. 
163  In his writing, Gary Botting has made the point that the Supreme Court’s post-Charter 
extradition jurisprudence reflects the many leading decisions written by Justice Gerard 
La Forest, which carried a very pro-extradition and pro-comity flavour. Indeed, the first 
edition of the La Forest textbook, which was written by Justice La Forest, was written 
as an extradition manual for Department of Justice lawyers (See Botting, Extradition 
Between Canada and the United States, supra note 92 at 22–27). 
164  Of course, it should be acknowledged that in some cases the “foreign state” will be the 
state of the person’s nationality, though nothing depends on that point nor does it 
undermine the argument I am making here. 
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Minister is constrained by the Charter not to surrender the individual to the 
foreign state in circumstances where their fate, as a result of being 
surrendered, would not be consistent with the principles of fundamental 
justice.165 Comity is balanced against that vital, constitutional interest. That 
is to say, what will happen to the individual as a result of actually being 
surrendered is a driver of the law in the surrender phase. There is no 
principled reason that, properly tailored, this legal interest cannot be taken 
into account at the committal stage. There is no reason that committal 
needs to be almost166 completely unconcerned with the criminal process and 
trial that awaits the person sought. There is, moreover, no reason that 
Crown personnel cannot act as “ministers of justice” in committal 
proceedings. 
To reach this conclusion, however, would take not only legislative 
amendment but a shift in the culture among Crown personnel who conduct 
extradition cases. Again, it is sometimes necessary to resort to anecdotal 
evidence to make certain points, both because there is so little inquiry and 
commentary on extradition in Canada and because Justice Canada and the 
IAG in particular are so opaque and secretive.167 Anecdotally speaking, 
then, it is well-known in Canadian circles that the Crown is ferocious and 
extremely adversarial in advancing the interests of its “clients” in extradition 
matters. Given the view of its role as expressed in the Segal Report, this 
would be unsurprising, and, of course, litigation is hardly a “tea party” as 
the old saying goes; one could expect, and even hope, for some tough 
lawyering given the important goals that extradition fulfills. 
That said, this adversarial stance sometimes appears excessive. In the 
case of Abdullah Khadr, for example, disclosure during the committal 
hearing revealed that the requesting state, the U.S., had engaged in what 
the committal judge termed “gross misconduct,” not least by putting a 
bounty on the head of the person sought, facilitating his mistreatment by 
Pakistani security forces, and breaching Canada’s right of access to its citizen 
        
165  Canada v Schmidt, [1987] 1 SCR 500 at 522, 39 DLR (4th) 18; Burns, supra note 57; 
MM, supra note 9. 
166  I say “almost” because the committal judge does have a narrow Charter-based 
jurisdiction to maintain the fairness of the hearing itself. This jurisdiction, in very rare 
circumstances, can produce a stay of proceedings based on the conduct of the 
requesting state. See Weinstein & Dennison, supra note 33, c 9. 
167  Even the Segal Report makes this point. See Segal Report, supra note 16 at 107. 
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under international law.168 It seemed clear that in requesting Khadr after all 
of this, the US was clearly abusing the process of Canada’s courts, yet the 
Crown pressed for extradition. When the committal judge stayed the 
proceeding because it was an abuse of process, the Crown appealed to the 
Ontario Court of Appeal where Justice Sharpe denounced both the 
extradition request and some of the Crown’s legal arguments in no 
uncertain terms, noting that to allow extradition in such circumstances 
would undermine the rule of law.169 The Crown’s response? A leave 
application to the Supreme Court of Canada which was denied.170 
The pressing question, in my view, is why the Crown “went to the wall” 
(to again use a colloquial phrase) on this case. The basis of the appeal 
seemed to be the issue of whether the two levels of court were somehow mis-
applying the test for abuse of process, though the arguments were not 
convincing. The leave application itself was a surprise; surely when one is 
handed such a resounding defeat by two levels of court, the best course 
would be to give up – not to press on with an extradition case so desperately 
tainted by the unlawful and shocking actions of the very state requesting 
extradition. Surely the people of Canada would want its government to stop 
such a case in its tracks after these court findings, at the very least so as not 
to throw good taxpayer dollars (lawyer time, resources) after bad. 
Yet there are cases that make it appear that the Crown is sometimes 
willing to pursue extradition at all costs. It is worth recalling that the 
landmark Supreme Court of Canada case on abuse of process at the 
committal phase, Cobb,171 came about because the Crown insisted on 
pressing forward with the extradition of a man who had been threatened by 
both the prosecutor and a presiding judge in the requesting state. In a recent 
and prominent British Columbia case, the IAG was so eager to keep two 
individuals from exercising any more procedural rights that it engaged in 
what the Court of Appeal called “subterfuge” in an attempt to rush them 
out of the country – which the Court held was an abuse of process that had 
“a very serious adverse impact on the integrity of the justice system.”172 
 
        
168  United States v Khadr, 2010 ONSC 4338. 
169  R v Cox, 2011 ONCA 58. 
170  United States v Khadr, 2011 ONCA 358, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 34357 (29 July 
2011).  
171  United States v Cobb, 2001 SCC 19. 
172  Badesha, supra note 156 at para 77. 
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B. Diab : “Lessons Learned”? 
The Diab case, one where more detail is known than most, is highly 
illustrative of the point I am making here. The Segal Report is replete with 
disturbing details, among them: 
• At the bail stage, the Crown did not provide an English 
translation of the French ROC materials and had to be ordered 
to do so, even though Diab was not fluent in French. It also 
opposed even the very restrictive bail that was granted and 
unsuccessfully challenged this at the Court of Appeal;173 
• For some reason the IAG initially took the position that 
translation of the ROC materials was not its responsibility 
(though later this stance was “properly abandoned”);174 
• Prior to the committal hearing proper, Diab’s counsel 
indicated that he would lead expert evidence that would 
destroy the foundation of the French handwriting reports that 
formed part of the ROC. It eventually emerged that the reports 
had been partly based on handwriting that was not Diab’s, but 
the experts nonetheless concluded that it matched the 
bomber’s prints. To deal with this development, the advisory 
counsel and litigation counsel worked together to warn the 
French investigating judge that this would undermine the case 
and request that he obtain new handwriting analyses which 
could be used. In the meantime, litigation counsel continued 
to argue that the flawed handwriting analyses were sufficiently 
reliable to ground committal but later changed tack and 
submitted the new handwriting analyses when they arrived;175 
• At one point, France realized that they had a sample of what 
were thought to be the bomber’s prints and requested that IAG 
send Diab’s fingerprints so that they could be compared. The 
Crown considered obtaining Diab’s prints surreptitiously but 
concluded that his counsel would probably challenge this in 
        
173  Segal Report, supra note 16 at 40–41. 
174  Ibid at 43. 
175  Ibid at 55–56. This particular stratagem raised concerns the ethical soundness of Mr. 
Lefrancois’s conduct, which I will not take up here but which Segal deals with at 95–
103. 
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court. Instead, the Crown arranged for France to send copies 
of the prints to Canada for comparison with those found in 
Diab’s arrest record. Of the six prints found in France, four of 
them were conclusively not Diab’s, and two were held to be 
inconclusive. Despite the obviously exculpatory nature of this 
evidence, IAG counsel decided it was “neither inculpatory nor 
exculpatory,” and while they sent the results to France, they did 
not disclose this to Diab on the basis that (1) the prints did not 
form part of the French case and (2) they did not want to take 
a chance of undermining the very restrictive approach taken to 
disclosure in the extradition case law;176 
• It was clear that the ROC contained unsourced intelligence, 
the unreliability and dangers of which have long been known 
(particularly to those who work in inter-state criminal 
cooperation).177 The Crown unsuccessfully opposed Diab being 
permitted to lead evidence on this point, and it was only after 
Professor Kent Roach had testified about it and final arguments 
were about to begin that they withdrew reliance on the 
unsourced intelligence.178 
Hassan Diab, it needs to be recalled, was wrongfully extradited. There 
is simply no other sensible conclusion. As regards the role of the Crown, 
the Segal Report is interesting because it raises two contradictory 
conclusions. The first is the conclusion reached by the report itself: in 
conducting the case, the Crown complied with all relevant legal and ethical 
norms and principles. This was certainly the view of the Crown officials to 
whom Segal spoke in preparing the Report; an internal “Lessons Learned” 
exercise ordered by the Minister revealed that IAG personnel found that 
“the current Canadian extradition system is fair and working well,” and, if 
anything, it needed to be made more efficient.179 Specific to Diab, the only 
        
176  Ibid at 10, 54. It is worth noting that the later French decision to discharge Diab held 
this very fingerprint evidence was “an essential element” of why the case against him 
was hopeless. 
177  Kent Roach, “The Eroding Distinction Between Intelligence and Evidence in Terrorism 
Investigations” in Nicola McGarrity, Andrew Lynch & George Williams, eds, Counter-
Terrorism and Beyond (New York: Routledge, 2010) 48. 
178  Segal Report, supra note 16 at 60. 
179  Ibid at 74. 
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problem with his case was that it was unduly protracted, and it was still 
entirely proper that he was extradited to France.180 
Though perhaps undermined slightly by the fact that Segal consulted 
predominantly Crown sources in putting the report together,181 this 
conclusion is nonetheless technically defensible – based on the way the 
committal phase is structured and the Crown’s view of their own function, 
everything is working as it is supposed to. Importantly, Segal’s terms of 
reference excluded any consideration of the Extradition Act itself or any 
consideration of how things should be. His result, however, underpins the 
second conclusion: if the Hassan Diab case can be held up as a model of 
how extradition is supposed to work, then Canadians require a serious 
inquiry into “how things should be.” This case featured Crown officials 
actively collaborating with a foreign state to shore up a case that was weak 
from the start, litigating with needless aggression against a Canadian citizen, 
withholding exculpatory evidence, and reaching the conclusion that a 
wrongful extradition was the correct result. All of this, of course, is in the 
context of a government department that dominates all of the decision-
making, subject to the modest judicial role. Specifically, it assists the 
requesting state, litigates on its behalf, makes the decision on whether to 
extradite, and fights off appeals and judicial reviews. It seems to me beyond 
question that if this is the state of the law then Canadians need to consider 
whether this is desirable or whether the system needs to be reformed. 
C. Potential Changes 
As noted above, this paper can only suggest directions and a few 
potential fixes for the problems besetting the Crown’s role in extradition 
since what is required is a full-scale judicial inquiry, sustained Parliamentary 
attention, or preferably both. That said, a few points offer themselves as 
obvious contenders for consideration. 
The first is the issue of exculpatory evidence in the hands of the 
authorities. As noted earlier, outside the narrow scope of a Charter motion 
or the highly-circumscribed process around the sufficiency of the requesting 
state’s case, the Crown has minimal duties of disclosure and the requesting 
        
180  Ibid at 77. 
181  And, to a limited extent, French sources of information. Segal notes that Dr. Diab and 
his counsel were invited to participate and declined. 
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state is practically immune.182 While it would be useful to explore disclosure 
in detail, I would offer, at a minimum, that exculpatory evidence in the 
hands of the Crown should be disclosed to the person sought, full stop. 
Recognizing that there is no such obligation in the current law, even the 
Segal Report recommends that such disclosure could be made, where the 
evidence is high-quality, “as a courtesy or discretionary call made in the 
circumstances of the particular case.”183 The Halifax Colloquium expressed 
the view this disclosure should be mandatory rather than discretionary, and 
regardless of whether the evidence was independently gathered by Canadian 
officials or disclosed to them. Also, whether the evidence is “exculpatory” 
or not should be assessed in compliance with the Stinchcombe criteria that 
bind the Crown in criminal cases. This would avoid the kind of mischief 
that occurred in Diab, where the Crown decided that fingerprints 
predominantly excluding the person sought were somehow “neither 
inculpatory nor exculpatory.” 
The Segal Report also spoke to the inter-mingling of roles among the 
Crown personnel, noting that most typically the litigation is done by a 
federal Crown in the relevant province, instructed by IAG counsel who also 
acts as a go-between with the requesting state. IAG personnel would also 
“advise” the Minister, draft the Minister’s decision, and then either conduct 
or instruct on appeals of committal and judicial reviews of surrender. Segal 
acknowledged that this might raise the appearance of conflicts of interest, 
particularly the direct contact between litigation counsel and the requesting 
state, which he viewed as generally inadvisable.184 Expressing his conviction 
that all involved “already act in a manner that ensures the requisite 
independence at each stage of the extradition proceedings,” he nonetheless 
felt that a “formal” separation of roles “would increase transparency and 
help to ensure the appearance of independence.”185 
The Halifax Colloquium essentially takes Segal’s latter 
recommendation as a starting point. There must certainly be litigation 
counsel who conduct adversarial litigation in extradition, and one would 
really not expect anything different. However, there is something wrong 
with a structure where the entire governmental litigation, advisory, and 
decision-making machinery are all arrayed against the person sought and 
        
182  Weinstein & Dennison, supra note 33, c 8. 
183  Segal Report, supra note 16 at 102. 
184  Ibid at 84. 
185  Ibid at 85. 
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uniformly driven by the imperative to extradite –especially in a legal process 
that, as the Supreme Court reminds us in MM, is supposed to facilitate 
comity and protect the rights of the person sought equally.186 A foreign state 
is simply not an ordinary client. One way to think about it is to consider 
the Attorney General of Canada as representing the requesting state, so 
litigation counsel would act in this capacity;187 the Minister of Justice 
(despite being the Attorney General’s alter ego in the constitutional sense) 
would play the separate and less adversarial role. Accordingly, separation 
could be imposed between Attorney General lawyers who litigate on the 
requesting states’ behalf and the Minister’s advisory counsel who facilitate 
communication with those states. The advisory counsel, in particular, 
should be oriented to act in the traditional Crown prosecutor mould of 
trying to achieve a just and fair result, rather than simply a “win.” 
All of this activity, moreover, should be separate from IAG’s other 
function of advising the Minister on whether surrender should be ordered. 
These lawyers should not be, as the old saying goes, “in each other’s 
pockets.” To underscore that fair treatment is just as important as comity, 
the Halifax Colloquium recommended that like other federal agencies such 
as the Immigration and Refugee Board, the IAG should adopt an explicit 
mandate to the effect that it administers its duties “efficiently, fairly and in 
accordance with the law.”188 
Finally, the Segal Report recommends that Justice Canada publish 
more information about extradition processes generally, including 
“statistics about extradition cases” and “the policies and procedures that 
guide decision-making by counsel within the IAG.”189 Transparency, Mr. 
Segal felt, would help to combat public ignorance and suspicion.190 I would 
echo this call but add an additional rationale: more information would 
        
186  MM, supra note 9 at para 1. 
187  This is what happens, formally speaking. See Weinstein & Dennison, supra note 33 at 
217–18. 
188  See the Board’s website: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (Ottawa: IRBC, last 
modified 26 January 2021), online: <irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/Pages/index.aspx> [perma.cc/V7 
7J-3VVM]. 
189  Segal Report, supra note 16 at 107. Not long before the Segal Report was released, the 
IAG did publish statistics on extradition between Canada and the US. See Canada, 
Department of Justice, Extradition Fact Sheet: Statistics on requests from the United States 
(Ottawa: DOJ, last modified 1 March 2019), online: <www.justice.gc.ca/eng/cj-jp/emla-
eej/stat.html> [perma.cc/W42J-PMN2].  
190  Segal Report, supra note 16 at 107. 
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assist Canadians in understanding the actual policies and practices which 
are in place and allow us to ask the tougher questions about whether they 
serve adequately to protect persons sought, especially in cases like Diab 
where, as the record shows, a wrongful extradition was actively sought and 
is not regretted by those who sought it. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
While attending a criminal law conference some years ago, I struck up 
a conversation with a federal litigator whom I knew to have worked on some 
extradition cases. When I brought up an interesting issue that had arisen in 
a couple of recent cases, the lawyer’s response was to smile and say 
(condescendingly, if truth be told), “Ah, academics hate extradition.” 
Suffice it to say, this seems like a misplaced opinion. “Academics” and 
indeed many other will know that extradition is one of the most important 
tools to suppress transnational crime. Given the increasing presence and 
intrusiveness of cross-border and even globalized criminal activity, it is 
important for Canada to be an effective and enthusiastic participant in 
inter-state cooperation efforts. We need an effective extradition system, and 
I should not be heard to suggest otherwise. 
However, it is equally important that our extradition system be 
procedurally fair and sufficiently protective of the rights of individuals 
caught up in it, including, but not limited to, Canadian citizens who are 
sought by foreign states for prosecution. As this paper has demonstrated, 
there are serious problems on both fronts. Hassan Diab’s case, in particular, 
powerfully makes the case that significant changes are needed in order to 
prevent wrongful extradition. I have argued here that: the committal 
process, while it seems consistent with Parliament’s design, is not Charter-
compliant and dissatisfactory on a number of fronts; and the role of the 
IAG should be re-thought and restructured. 
Currently, we are living with the Prime Minister’s apparently broken 
promise to usher in change that will prevent a re-occurrence, IAG’s 
insistence that there are no problems with the current system, and courts 
which are deferential to the status quo. It appears that public attention and 
Parliamentary scrutiny are the next logical steps to enact meaningful change, 
and it is past time that we had more of both. 
 
